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'Nowadays I prefer to remain silent about Nietzsche.. .The only 
valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche's is precisely to use it, to 
deform it, to make it groan and protest.. And if the commentators then say 
that I am being faithful or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely 
no interest. ' (  ) In that spirit, this paper is not intended as a 
Baedecker's Guide to Foucault, a further attempt to discover a 'true' 
Foucault, excluding all others and their possibility. All too often, the 
'keys' to Foucault 'discovered' in such guides are made of ice. They melt 
at the touch. The various magics they sometimes reveal in Foucault's 
oevre, and even more commonly, the flaws they sometimes discover or the 
critiques they enter, tend to a kind of essentialism. First, the essence 
of the Foucaultian 'system' is revealed. Then it is valorized, high or 
low. JG. Merquior offers just such an account in his Foucault in the 
Fontana Modern Masters series. In the manner of the history of ideas, with 
only hints of the hostility to come, Merquior reviews some of Foucault's 
pivotal texts. By the end, the allegation of Foucault's 'neo-anarchism' 
comes as no surprise. Kathedernihilismus, however, suggested by Merquior 
as Foucault's destination, a sort of final essentialist location, this is 
something of a shock. Yet Merquior's conclusion is a function of his 
procedure. This is the essentialist rule of 'reading' via procedures of 
classification, scrutiny of sources and intellectual affinities. and the 
discovery of a final location in a lattice of possible positions which 
already exists in the head of the reader. It is an elevated sort of 
pigeon-holing. It separates the oevre scrutinised from the scrutineer. It 2 ,, 
C 
renders Foucault's work an object of intellectual analysis, separate from . * 
1 
the reader, an independent 'other', part of an objective world to be 
revealed purely by reflection. Without engaging the identities and 
subjectivities of the reader, it is designed precisely to reveal a 'true' 
Foucault. It proceeds on the basis of conceptions of truth, 
value-neutrality and scholarly objectivity which Foucault explicitly 
refuses. In a sense, it is what passes for 'science' in this sphere, and 
it doesn't seem to me to work too well if the Merquior text is taken as the 
measure. For, in common with other commentators. he seeks to authorise an 
essentialist truth which excludes its opposites and even most alternatives. 
This is in stark contrast to Foucault's own appropriation of Nietzsche 
quoted above where using and deforming, making groan and protest, take 
priority over any authorisation of 'truth'. 
Nevertheless, it may be objected, an authoritative 'reading' at 
least excludes the possibility of political hijack, of impertinent 
annexation, of improper scholarly appropriation as well as certain forms of 
radical 'button-pushing', sometimes chic, sometimes simply illegitimate. 
The fluidity of Foucault's writing, its sheer difficulty as well as its 
unremitting and occasionally confusing oppositions, lends itself perhaps to 
one or all of these. For, make no mistake, Foucault is certainly 
fashionable. Yet his work also commands a substantial presence in 
contemporary debates on science and reason,- truth, knowledge and power; 
that is, in a whole slew of questions pertinent to history, philosophy and 
politics and fundamental to central questions of social science. The 
current state of some of these debates plainly shows that the work of 
Michel Foucault is capable of many readings, not always compatible, whose 
purpose in principal part is to situate the speaker in respect of his or 
her particular appropriation of Foucault: a veritable craft-industry of 
theoretical and critical interpretation. Ensuing exchanges in print reach 
dizzying heights of synthetic brilliance as to intimidate those, like the 
present writer, who either choose to enter the intellectual world of 
Foucault suddenly, in a single terrifying plunge, or who, more commonly, 
are coerced into doing so. Partly the coercion takes the form of a fear of 
ignorance of that which generates so much heat and dust and excitement all 
around. Partly it derives from accumulating disatisfactions as to one's 
own intellectual practice within discourses and systems of thought 
gradually decaying, and not only at the edges, under the incremental 
h U assault, the flourish, the bravado and derring-do, and, sometimes it feels, 
I? 
the sheer cheek of the Foucaultians and the poststructuralists. 
L. 
Geoff Eley has recently given us his thoughts on the impact of 
their critique on the field of social history ( . Along the way, he 
seeks to de-polemicise the debate and enters a plea for constructive 
pluralism, a recognition of differences and their clarification through 
argument. My own reading of Foucault leads me to an (unduly severe?) 
scepticism as to the existing conditions of possibility for such a 
pluralism. Recurring claims in some quarters that the work of Foucault 
reveals an entirely new tissue of analytical salience in respect of power 
and its disposition; that Foucault's questions press former totalizing 
theories of power and process to the margin; and, in perhaps its strongest 
form, that Foucault's concepts and practices serve to 'decapitate' formerly 
unassailable cardinal concepts, grand narratives, and over-arching 
theoretical accounts - all these should be treated with caution, I guess. 
After all, such radical novelty, if indeed it is truly to be discovered in 
the texts of post-structuralism, tends inherently to lay waste what has 
gone before, and to place its adherents in a posture of implicit polemics 
or open proselytism. At the very least it must be admitted that the 
- enthusiasm of some Foucaultians, verging at its worst on a form of 
sycophancy, can sometimes make the hackles and the reflex of resistance 
rise fairly rapidly. These are not self-evidently the conditions 
appropriate to pluralist debate, the cool recognition of difference and its 
exploration through unheated argument. 
Save for one exceptional circumstance of the present time, I 
suspect that, to the contrary, the scene would .be set for a further 
prolonged, polemical and destructive exchange such as marked the reception 
of the work of Althusser in the United Kingdom some ten or more years ago( 
. The circumstance I refer to., of course, is the rapid collapse of 
various Stalinisms in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and the more or less 
contemporaneous implosions of certitude in and around what, for economy's 
sake, might be referred to as traditional Western rnarxisms.( ) Sustained 
and truly destructive polemics require at least two poles of mutual 
hostility and systematic deligitimation. For the moment at least, one of 
them is absent without leave. A space for debate certainly exists, but 
largely I fear by default. It is provided in the main by an 'accidental' 
freedom from inquisitorial demands: to take sides, to state a position in 
respect of a vituperative row whose polemical form required, it seemed in , 
w ,I 
the case of the Althusser debate, the enunciation of imcompatible truths t 
and the consequent deligitimization of the project of the 'enemy'. 
Foucault's own principled position on these questions is certainly 
attractive and congenial, declining, sometimes under severe provocation, to 
engage in polemical exchange or even to defend himself against charges 
levelled from a variety of quarters. This seems to have been Foucault's 
position in the last years of his life at any rate. So, in this period, 
whatever else Foucault offers us, it is never a 'police action' against 
error, never a 'straightening' of the intellectual line, never accusatory 
intervention, seldom the allegation that opposing theoretical perspectives 
lead to abhorrent political practices. 
What I think he does offer is a new and complex way of 
seeing relations and practices of power. His method, on my reading, is not 
that of 'decapitation' of previous analytical dicourses. Rather, he 
raises new questions on new terrains in seeking to illuminate the 
practices and consequences of the exercise of power. Yours are interesting 
questions, he seems to be saying, but they are not my questions. These are 
my questions: '... the questions I am trying to ask are not determined by a 
pre-established political outlook and do not tend toward the realisation of 
some definite political project ... This is doubtless what people mean when 
they reproach me for not presenting an overall theory. But I believe 
precisely that the forms of totalization offered by politics are always, in 
fact, very limited. I am attempting, to the contrary, apart from any 
totalization - which would be at once abstract and limiting - to open up 
problems that are as concrete and general as possible, problems that 
approach politics from behind and cut across societies on the diagonal (my 
ital.), problems that are at once constituents of our history and 
constituted by that history; for example, the problem of the relation 
between sanity and insanity; the question of illness, of crime, of 
sexuality. And it has been necessary to raise them both as present-day 
questions and as historical ones, as moral, epistemological, and political 
problems.'( ) 
So Foucault's practice is not a practice of falsification. 
'decapitation', or any other form of conceptual dragon-slaying. His 
practice is one of refusal or even of circumnavigation. It is clear that 
5 2 the valorization of statements on the basis of their falisifiability, and 
ir 
,. the practice of falsification itself have little or no place in Foucault's 
thought or modes of argument. They belong to a tradition which he 
explicity refuses. (See Rabinow and?). As a result, there exist radical 
incompatibilities between Foucault's notations of power and those of 
previous 'structuralists' and others. I am unconvinced therefore that a 
debate such as that proposed by Eley, however open and pluralist, however 
little polemical and destructive, can serve even to begin to synthesise the 
various poles of argument. The evident discontinuities are simply too 
radical for that, their incompatible consequences for the analysis of 
knowledge, power and practice simply too complete. An example. At the 
outset I had thought that Gramsci's notion of 'consent' might serve as a 
place to seek for continuity, or at any rate, a kind of communication 
between Foucault on power, and some of the most fertile marxian studies of 
the operation and effects of power in the 'sphere of the superstructures', 
. . 
in the realm of the cultural, and in the institutions of civil society. 
-,. 
Self-evidently, it seemed, these were the social spheres of Foucault's own . . -*. . 
detailed analyses: the prison, the asylum, the clinic, the body and 
22z -. . 
discourses of sexuality. Not quite what Gramsci meant by civil society, 
perhaps, but, empirically, at first blush, not a mi1,lion miles away either. 
Both plainly departed from economic and other reductionisms, from 
reflexive, knee- jerk notations of class power and ,crude calibrations of 
class- dominion and subjugation. Neither claimed possession of a magic 
conceptual grid serving to filter all knowledge of conflict, tensions and 
-. 
human.unhappiness, discharging it back into a pure and unsullied stream of 
class contradiction. Each. focussed, it seemed, on the 'superstructural' 
complexities of advancing capitalist societies, and awarded these 
compexities at least a relative autonomy. Both recognised openly the. 
unique particularities of determinate, sometimes national social formations 
in specific historical time: ' ... power is not an institution,'writes 
Foucault,'and not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are 
endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a complex strategical 
situation in a particular society.' (HofS 93) There are many further 
passages, especially in the History of Sexuality, where Foucault's language 
resonates with an apparent - ~ramscianism: 'Power comes from below,' he 
writes,' that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition 
between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a 
general matrix - no such duality extending from the top down and reacting 
on more and more limited groups to the the very depths of the social body. 
One must suppose rather that the manifold relationships of force that take 
shape and come into play in the machinery of productiuon, in families. ,. fl 
(1 
limited groups, and institutions, are the basis for wide-ranging effects of 
0 
cleavage that run throught the social body as a whole. These then form a 
general line of force that traverses the local oppositions and links them 
together . . . .Maj or dominations are the hegemonic effects that are sustained 
by all these confrontations.'(94) 
So, 'Foucault meets Gramsci' was the provisional title of this 
paper. But they do not meet. On the contrary, as I shall argue, their 
respective work may be seen as a site of the radical discontinuities 
referred to a moment ago. Discontinuity. Not an arena of contest, 
struggle, or polemics, but a radical discontinuity. Not an unclear and 
shadowy failure to communicate, but a radically different language. 
Before exploring this further however, I want to enter some other points of 
difficulty. 
Foucault expressly refuses to be situated on the 'chessboard' - 
it is a recurrent theme of his various interviews.( 1 This is so whether 
the chessboard is a political one, or one designed to grid the lines of his 
intellectual descent or dependency after the fashion of the history of 
ideas. He consistently declines close citation or reference to the three 
'sources' whose cardinal importance he acknowledges in general terms: 
Marx, Freud and Nietzsche. '...I quote Marx without saying so, without 
quotation marks, and because people are incapable of recognising Marx's 
texts I am thought to be someone who doesn't quote MarxP.(Prison talk 52) 
~ietzskhe, as we have seen, he makes groan and protest. His mode of 
presentation not only makes things hard for the novice reader. It lays him 
open to attack from an astonishing variety of directions. Foucault's 
'anti-Marxism' is commonly asserted. He is attacked for anti-rationalism, 
and sometimes for embracing the irrational in the form of radical 
subjectivism.( ) He is accused of an epistemological anarchism, curiously 
like that advanced by Feyerabend ( ) ,  but now used as a catch-all by those 
who criticise Foucault for anti-scientism, or the refusal to develop a 
general theory of his own. He is reviled, among-others, for dilettantism, 
for enjoying the puns and paradoxes of a belle-lettriste, 
self-congratulatory and smart-arsed French tradition( . And, finally, he 
is charged with failure to make his work converge to a political or 
normative practice, and, by implication, with a consequent political 
Yet no reader of Foucault can fail to discover in his 
work a quality of implacable opposition, of resistance, of critical irony, 
of hatred of the human consequences of the practice of power, and, on 
occasion, a tone of moral distress. Foucault the subject is visible in his 
writings, often hurting, frequently doubtful, constantly resistant. 
Indeed, it can plausibly be argued that Foucault's whole oevre is 
resistance, but in a local, sectoral, micro-political sense, 
circumnavigating the grand categories of state and class-struggle. 
Neverthless, the charge against him of political failure, of implicit 
quietism, is probably the one most pertinent to this paper. It raises 
precisely the questions I want to touch on in the next section: those of 
power and knowledge, the place of intellectuals, the nature of resistance 
and the conditions of its possibility. I am convinced that it is based 
upon a misreading. Yet it provides a point of departure, as well as a 
moment of real irritation. 
-" - 
-- .- -. . Perhaps now is the time to confess to an unexpected enthusiasm 
-- 
C -- - for Foucault's notations of power, knowledge, societies and the appropriate .- 
- - -- .. - -- forms of their analysis - in so far as I understand them. What follows in - 
this paper should be read as the contingent efforts of a reluctant 
Foucaultian to situate himself along two 'or three significant lines of 
debate, a further contribution to the craft-industry which threatens to 
displace, for the moment at least, traditional forms of social scientific 
enquiry as well as the broadly consensual, if largely unreflected, axioms - 
of scholarly knowledge production. The first obstacle to this modest 
-. project, however, lies less with the question of situating oneself in 
respect of Foucault's writings, and more with the problem of situating 
Foucault in and against a background of discourses and silences passing 
like shadows through one's own assumptions about self, society, power and 
the production of knowledges. It would be easier not to start from here: 
as Foucault himself tells us, with some pain, beginnings are hard, if not 
impossible( . Yet we do and must. 
Foucault's writings, and their reception in intellectual 
territories which are broadly familiar, do not always help, endlessly and 
deliberately cutting across familiar patterns and practices of reading, 
associating, connecting; continuously disrupting long-entertained reflexes 
which fluently 'discover' in all texts familiar affinities, systematic 
continuities, lines of intellectual descent, incomplete affiliations or 
poorly-concealed dependencies, clever classification and a final location. J 
G 
It is not so much that Foucault is hard to classify via the daily protocols 
of 'reading'. Rather his m r k  refuses them, disrupts them, and threatens 
to make them an object of his own analysis of power, knowledge and 
discourse. He proposes to make an analytical agenda out of one's own 
hitherto unquestioned, regular practices, out of that mesh of knowledges 
that we understand as the intellectual tools of our trade, our 'absolute 
presuppositions9.( ) As a result, Foucault disturbs, at any rate he 
disturbs me, sometimes engendering precisely the sense of jeopardy and 
disorientation of The Man Without  Q u a l i t i e s :  
"...one cannot step into the street or drink a glass of water or 
get into a tram without touching the perfectly balanced levers of a 
gigantic apparatus of laws and relations, setting them in motion or letting 
them maintain one in the peace and quiet of one's existence. One knows 
hardly any of these levers, which extend deep into the inner workings and 
on the other side are lost in a network the entire constitution of which 
has never . been disentangled by any living being. Hence one denies their 
existence, just as the common man denies the existence of air, insisting 
that it is mere emptiness; but it seems that precisely this is what lends 
life a certain spectral quality - the fact that everything that is denied 
reality, everything that is colourless, odourless, tasteless, imponderable 
and non-moral, like water, air, space, money and the passing of time, is in 
reality what is most important."( ) 
Questions of class power and subordination in capitalist 
societies have lain at the very centre of the development of social history 
as a field in the last twenty or thirty years. They do not exhaust the 
discipline's grid of salient questions, but they have provided the basis of 
a large segment of its significant output. They have certainly stood at 
the crux of the fiercest debates in the field, and provided the site of 
recurrent waves of polemic since the 1960's. This is not the place to 
review the development of social history in the UK, or elsewhere, still 
less to provide an account of its many moments of conceptual rupture, 
productive and otherwise. This has been done already more than once( 1. 
What I want simply to assert here is the centrality of the questions 
themselves. They are plainly reflected in the field's various languages, 
concepts, even buzzwords. Recognize the following as the organizing 
.postulates of modern social history : the aristocracy of labour thesis; the 
mobilization of 'social control'; the operation of hegemonies; class 
. . _-negotiation and the winning of consent; the importance of the spheres of 
culture and of civil society in reproducing and maintaining class power; 
the seemingly endless arguments as to the precise relationships between 
.base and superstructure; claims for 'determination' but only in the last 
instance; the operation of structures 'behind mens' backs'. At one recent 
time or another, all of these have enjoyed a prominent place in the 
practice of social history or in the arguments which have riven the 
discipline from time to time. 
Even where the importation of 'foreign' concepts has been most 
resisted, especially among those ungraciously referred to as 
'culturalists', the assumption of a class subordination was fully in play. 
Retrievals of the defeated from the condescension of posterity, or 
histories designed to recuperate the authenticity of a subordinated culture 
plainly assume the fact of class domination, and seek to illuminate it 
empirically. As a result it can reasonably be argued that the relations of . 
class in capitalism, and their determinant role in processes of historical 
change, are assumed by both 'structuralists' and 'culturalists' to be 
pivotal. Taken together these embrace almost all the theorizations of power 
we have come to associate with a left social history. This was the case 
even when the field was locked in apparently mortal, internecine combat in 
the late 1970's and early 1980's. The antagonists shared more than they , , 
knew or were prepared to admit. o 
Yet it is at least plausible that their conflict was not so much 
about history or society directly. Rather, I suspect, the Althusserian 
'moment', especially, was a struggle for the 'true' Marx, the authoritative 
reading, the authorised version.(Johnson art.) Such a struggle is familiar 
enough from spheres other than that of historiography. After all, Lenin 
made much of the authority of his own appropriation of Marx, not least his 
closure of its alternatives by one means or another. In the case of the 
writing of social history, the politics of theoretical appropriation are 
less obvious and their consequences seldom resonate outside the field 
itself. Yet, arguably, they serve to attenuate it, occasionally concealing 
in a flak of bombast and bitter polemics precisely what the poles of 
argument share. This shared terrain is worth exploring a little further . 
The resilience of modern capitalism takes pride of place here. 
It seems able to ride out self-generated cycles of boom and slump, and to 
survive apparently terminal crises. It constantly reproduces social 
conditions appropriate to its own survival. The dominant class maintains 
its own capacity to act partly by maintaining the dominated class in place, 
moulding it, modifying it, punitively eliminating its differences through 
processes of control like education and the mass media, or repressing its 
resistances by the use of force. Contradictions engendered between the 
forces of production and the relations of production (Marx's classical 
statement in the 1859 Preface) are handled either by the naked use of 
disciplinary power, by the agencies of the state, or within the 
superstructural hegemonies of law, culture and information. This, at any 
rate, is the run of the argument in its simplest, most classical form. The 
question it raises acutely is this: if capitalism is so resilient, so 
subtle in its exercise of class power, so all-embracing in its control, how 
can socialism ever be achieved? Moreover, how can a subaltern class within 
capitalism hope to escape the repressive class tyrannies which so dominate 
its daily life? How can the commanding heights of the bourgeois, 
capitalist state ever be stormed? Or the class hegemonies in the 
superstructure broken? 
In recent years, important work in social history has focused upon 
the reproduction of class relations in historical conditions of no obvious 
violence - the threat of it perhaps, but not its exercise. Following 
Gramsci, the questions of the 'consent' of the subaltern class and how it 
is won in civil society, have been prominent. The state and its 
apparatuses have receded as a centre of attention, if indeed they were ever 
prominent in empirical work (fn Where are the detailed social histories of 
the police or the military or the bureaucracy?). 'In Russia,' Gramsci 
writes in the Prison Notebooks, 'civil society was primordial and 
gelatinous; in the West there was a proper relation between State and civil 
society, and when the State trembled a sturdy structure of of civil society 
was at once revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which 
there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks, more or less 
numerous from one state to the next, it goes without saying - but this 
precisely necessitated an accurate reconnaissance of each individual 
country'.(Selections 238, 1982 ed.) 
This reasoning has given us some of the most fruitful accounts 
. -- - --. -of the history of class relations in specific societies at specific times. 
-. -. --- --It frees analysis from seeking an infrastructural cause for every political 
--. . -- a event, the reductionist reflex of a previous marxian historiography. It 
-- - recognises the historical particularities of single, national societies, 
-- .- .and the need for their detailed empirical reconnaissance and historical 
- recuperation. At the same time, it insists that the relations of power are 
-- -. -:-imbricated in the practices of daily life, not simply at the point where 
individuals or groups meet the State. And it suggests, to some at least, 
therefore, that the life of a subaltern class is more complex, fuller and 
richer, than simply the reflexes of its subordination. Gramsci's concepts 
of 'consent', of 'civil society' and of cultural rather than simply 
political 'hegemony', have fertilised social history in recent times, and 
in important ways liberated it from a reductionist problematic. In an 
important sense, these insights and the social histories which flow from 
them may be seen as a rich catalogue of the sites of essential struggle, 
significant points of the exercise of class power and the possible forms of 
resistance to it. 
Fertile though this tendency has been however, the central 
theorization of power on which it is based remains broadly familiar. The 
Gramscian contribution has not so much tansformed the theorization of class 
power itself, or indeed, shifted its absolute centrality. Rather it has 
?. , 
transferred to new sites the analysis of the exercise of that power, in ct 
particular towards the spheres of culture and civil society, and away from 
the repressive apparatuses of the class state itself. This argument 
cannot be fully developed here, but a couple of these points are worth 
repetition and development. They are intended to isolate precisely the - 
discontinuities which lie between Gramsci's practice, his notation and 
analysis of power, and that of Foucault. 
The first is concerned with Gramsci's purpose in the Prison 
Notebooks and elsewhere. Facing the tenacity of capitalism, he recognises 
the internal complexity of modern capitalist societies, realising that much 
of their capacity for reproduction and self-renewal lie outside the state's 
ability to mobilise force. He finds these capacities rather in culture and 
in the institutions of civil society. No matter that Gramsci's account of 
the relationship between state and civil society fluctuates considerably, 
as Perry Anderson has shown( ) ,  sometimes claiming an autonomy for civil 
society, sometimes seeing it as a part of the state itself. Gramsci's 
precise definition of civil society and its institutions is not the 
principal matter of concern here. However he defines it, and however rich 
his conception of the cultures and practices inscribed within it, it is yet 
a site of class and power relations. It is an arena in which the 
contradictory relationships and the power-play of classes under capitalism 
are enacted. As we have seen, it takes us far from crude economic 
reductionism in its explanation of these relations and it opens new 
horizons of social and historical analyis. But it leaves the centrality of 
class power as the fundamental object of analysis. In this respect, 
whatever insights Gramsci gives us, and in my view they are many, his work 
leaves us still on a familiar terrain of unequal class relations as the 
dominant, unitary form and source of power in society. He leaves us with a 
refined view of the particular historical enactment of class domination and 
subjugation in Italian and other capitalist societies. He exposes a subtle 
tissue of power relations not simply at the level of the state, but across 
and through the daily life of a whole society. Yet, for Gramsci, however 
they occur, however silently they move, however subtly they mobilise the 
subaltern consciousness, the pivotal relations of power in society remain 
those of class. Their principal purpose is to reproduce the social and 
other conditions in which capitalism can reproduce itself - not just social 
stabilities or freedom from class war, but also the biological reproduction 
of labour power, and its cultural conditioning. The field of. force 
. . surrounding the relations of class, and the balance of forces within them, 
I? determine the chances of stability or change and condition the 
possibilities of revolution. Class, therefore, is simply a given. Its 
cruciality for his analysis of power is absolute. Conditions of class 
society provide the pivot of all its power relations. Class is the 
conceptual headquarters from which proceed all repressions, all hegemonies, 
all attempts to win consents. Power and its purposes are invariably class 
power and class purposes. 
This account is not intended as an attack on Gramsci. and should 
not be taken as such. It is intended rather to show the obvious, I 
suppose: that is, to demonstrate that Gramsci, for all his innovations, is 
embedded in a Marxist tradition for which the springs of historical change 
lie in the contradictions between the forces and the social relations of 
production. These define the limits of significant conflict, if not its 
precise historical form. In the latter lies Gramsci's principal insight: 
he illuminates some of the peaceful mechanisms through which capitalism 
.reproduces itself. He addresses the problem of power as something more 
.-than merely repression and coercion of one class by another. His notion 
-of 'consent' at least begins to suggest that the contents of the 
consciousness of the subaltern. class are more complex than the conditions 
of its subjugation might suggest. And his belief in the construction of a 
counter-hegemony proposes a form of class resistance alternative to a full 
frontal Bolshevik-style assault on the power of the bourgeois state. 
In this sense, Gramsci's work is intended to provide the pivot of 
an analyis of modern capitalism around which might develop the levers of 
its revolutionary transformation. His analysis is precisely intended to 
converge to revolutionary politics, to a political strategy. The degree to 
which the PC1 under Togliatti was able to employ the resultant strategy is 
open to argument. But it is plain that the partial transfer of the 
revolutionary struggle to the institutions of civil society was a part of 
it. So, profoundly unlike the work of Foucault on power, Gramsci's 
analyses were designed to convene revolutionary opposition, precisely to 
create a new political strategy appropriate to socially complex, modern 
conditions in the West. In this respect, his methods, his purposes and 
procedures were those of Marx himself. First, an intense reflection on the 
world as object, outside, difficult to penetrate but nevertheless open to 
the intellectual's independent mind. Second, to discover by reflection 
the springs of power in capitalist society, and the levers by which it + 
might be resisted or overturned, the laws of its motion reversed. Third to 3 
develop a working-class political strategy consistent with a sophisticated 
analysis of bourgeois class power thus provided. The structures of class, 
the centrality of state power, and the marxian problematic of contradiction 
lie at the very crux, providing a tissue of assumptions about the nature of 
power, a set of 'absolute pre-suppositions' apparently valorized by a 
scientific procedure. 
For me, the most fascinating thing about Foucault lies in his 
radical disengagement from these concepts, methods and assumptions - that 
is, exactly in his discontinuities. An example: 'By power,' says 
Foucault, 'I do not mean "Powerr" as a group of institutions and mechanisms 
that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given state. By power, I 
do-not mean, either, a mode of subjugation which, in contrast to violence, 
has the form of the rule. Finally, I do not have in mind a general system 
of domination exerted by one group over another, a system whose effects, 
through successive derivations, pervade the entire social body. The 
analysis, made in terms of power, must not assume that the sovereignty of 
the state, the form of the law, or the over-all unity of a domination are 
given at the outset; rather these are only the terminal form power takes'. 
(HofS 92) 
The sovereignty of the state, class dominion where it exists, the 
subtle subjugation of the subaltern, are all, by this account, the 
destination, the terminus of the processes of power. 'Social hegemonies' 
are the results of the endless play of power, not its source or its cause. 
In this way Foucault reverses the essential flow of the argument about the 
nature of power. He does not deny the existence of the state as a locus of 
power. He does not entirely refuse a conception of social hegemony turning 
around social divisions of class. He does not rule out, in the manner of 
some post-structuralists, the analytical pertinence of the social formation 
- the 'entire social body'. Rather, what he argues is this: that far from 
being the centralised, unitary sources of power, all these are the results 
of its exercise in other, more localised domains. All of them depend upon 
a whole field of prior power relations. In this account, the state, for 
example, does not control, manipulate, or inaugurate by acting as the 
Conrmittee of Public Safety of the dominant class. On the contrary, the 
ability of that class to act through a state depends upon the 'complex, 
strategical situation' in the power relations of a particular society. It 
is not a given. It is not a prime cause. It does not represent an 
omnipresent or inexhaustible sump of class power exercised through 
mechanisms of repression by force or those of winning the grudging consent 
of the subordinated: 
"To pose the problem in terms of the state means to continue posing 
it in terms of sovereign and sovereignty, that is to say, in terms of law. 
If one describes all [the] phenomena of power as dependent on the state 
apparatus, this means grasping them as essentially repressive: the army as 
a power of death, police and justice as punitive instances, etc. I don't 
want to say that the state isn't important; what I want to say is that 
relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made of them, 
necessarily extend beyond the limits of the state. In two senses: first of 
all because the state, for all the omnipotence of its apparatuses, is far 
from being able to occupy the whole field of actual .power relations, and 
further because the state can only operate on the basis of other, already 
existing power relations. The s t a t e  i s  superstructural  in re la t ion  t o  a  
whole s e r i e s  o f  power networks that  i nve s t  the body, . s e xua l i t y ,  the family ,  
k insh ip ,  knowledge, technology, and so f o r th  [my italics]. True, these 
.networks stand in a conditioning-conditioned relationship to a kind of 
'metapower' which is structured essentially around a certain number of 
great prohibitive functions; but this metapower with its prohibitions can 
only take hold and secure its footing in a whole series of multiple and 
indefinite power relations that supply the basis for the great negative 
forms of power."(Rabinow 63-4) 
Let there be no misunderstanding here: Foucault is not asserting 
that the multiple networks of actual power relations are simply the 
building blocks of a 'metapower' at the level of the state or of social 
hegemony. They are not the fragments of localised practices which 
accumulate spontaneously to form the great, unitary forms of state power, 
or, indeed, any other generalised fount of power. On the contrary, 
multiple, local, micro-political relations of power create the conditions 
of its possibility: '...the state consists in the codification of a whole , , 
number of power relations which render its functioning possible'(Rab. 6 5 ) .  +J 
he writes. Codification, note, not absorption or subsumption, or even 
annexation. The state does not represent a field of intentionality and 
rationality openly reflected in the practices of power as Foucault sees 
them. The state is not the condensation of these practices in a 
transcendent form of metapower. Indeed, to the contrary, he frequently 
expresses doubts about the clarity of the relationship between local or 
sectoral forms of the exercise of power and the alleged general purposes of 
class domination or capitalism. For example, he expresses a refreshing 
doubt in the matter of discourses of sexuality as to whether the ultimate 
objective of their creation is to '...ensure population, to reproduce labor 
capacity, to perpetuate the form of social relations; in short, to 
constitute a sexuality that is economically useful and politically 
conservative?'(HofS 37). 'I still do not know whether this is the ultimate 
objective', he writes. 
In short, in this way he tentatively disengages from the broad 
raft of assumptions and of 'absolute presuppositions' which inhabit marxian 
analysis, be it reductionist or not. . The significance of this 
disengagement is crucial. It does not amount to a finalised 
deligitimation, to an essentialist rejection or falsification. This is not 
the manner of it at all. Indeed, it should not be assumed either that the 
critique of these assumptions lies at the centre of Foucault's project. He 
certainly does not start with them. His disengagement from them is a 
consequence and not a starting point of his work; it is the result of his 
own analyses of power not a point of polemical departure. Its immediate 
merit may be seen as two-fold. First, it provides a startling exit from 
the labyrinths of marxian debate, not least in the sphere of the 
development of modern social history. Second, probably more important, it 
opens space for the consideration of some pertinent questions. Among 
these, as I see it, the most important is that a reading of Foucault 
invites the question: what are the  ac tual  con ten t s  o f  power, and through 
what mechanisms do t h e  pract ices  of power a c t u a l l y  work? 
For Foucault the practices of power are not simply given 
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within the co-ordinates of a general theory of capitalism. Their 
consequences cannot be read off from the assumptions and assertions of such 
a general theory, however sophisticated might become the empirical analyses 
which result. That is, in Foucaultian terms, analytical distinctions drawn 
between what, for economy's sake, we have referred to as reductionism or as 
culturalism, have little meaning. Both proceed with a shared tissue of 
assumption about the fundamental nature of capitalism and its 
charactersitic structures of class, even though they ascribe to the 
enactment of their power-effects different sites, different procedures and 
different levels of sophistication. But what if the categories given in 
the general theory are illusions, deriving from an intellectual or 
scientific practice which is itself inscribed in the actual power relations 
of historical and contemporary societies? What if the procedures by which 
the givens are  provided and the knowledges created are themselves a part of 
the discursive practices of power? What if these procedures, and the 
knowledges which result from their application, lie integrally within the 
networks of power in our present time? Far from being the results of 
- - -. rational reflection on an objective world outside and beyond, what if these 
--.. - knowledges lie i n s i d e  the networks and practices of power and, at the same 
- -. time, serve to constitute them, to 'authorise' them within some mutualities 
-- .,. of power-knowledge? Then the exquisite, and occasionally bloody 
distinctions of marxian debate are collapsed, each pole of argument 
forming a support for a contingent 'regime of truth', a discourse of power. .. - 
or a fragment of one. 
This line of reasoning is surely familiar enough from a reading 
of Foucault. He insists, for example, that his concern is not with truth, 
but with 'truth-effects'; not with scrupulously neutral knowledge of 
objective world but with the power and truth-effects of the 'knowledge' 
itself. ".. .  I believe that the problem does not consist in drawing the line 
between that in a discourse which falls under the category of scientificity 
or truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in seeing 
historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in 
themselves are neither true or false."(Rab. 60) There is little time here 
to develop this further, yet perhaps a couple of points may be entered. 
In trying to grasp Foucault's argument in this respect, I have 
found Feyerabend's Against Method. Outline o f  an anarchis t ic  theory o f  , 
knowledge more than merely pertinent: 
, 
"Scientific education as we know it today. :. simplifies 'science' by , ., 
simplifying its participants: first, a domain of research is defined. The 1) 
domain is separated from the rest of history.. .and given a 'logic' of its 
own. A thorough training in such a 'logic' then conditions those working in 
the domain; it makes their actions more uniform and it freezes large parts 
of the historical process. Stable 'facts' arise and persevere despite the 
vicissitudes of history. An essential part of the, training that makes such 
facts appear (sic) consists in the attempt to inhibit intuitions that might 
lead to a blurring of the boundaries. A person's religion, for example, or 
his metaphysics, or his sense of humour...must not have the slightest 
connection with his scientific activity. This is again reflected in the 
nature of scientific 'facts' which are experienced as being independent of 
opinion, belief, and cultural background ... It is thus possible to create a 
tradition that is held together by strict rules, and that is also 
successful to some extent. But is it desirable to support such a tradition 
to the exclusion of everything else? Should we transfer to it the sole 
rights for dealing in knowledge, so that any result that has been obtained 
by other methods is at once ruled out of courtl(l9)" 
Now, Feyerabend is dealing centrally with paradigms of scientific 
knowledge, and the tyrannies, as he sees them, of the methods of their 
generation. In the main, Foucault admits the pertinence of the knowledges 
of the 'hard' sciences to his analysis but chooses rather to deal with.the 
'softer'ones: .psychiatry, medicine, penology etc. What he shares with 
Feyerabend, therefore, is not a definite terrain of analysis, but a way of 
looking at power inside knowledge, and knowledge inside power, at the power 
of discursive knowledges to exclude their opposites and to 'authorise' a 
unitary, exclusive truth. For Feyerabend, the present paradigms of natural 
science assert that there exists but one path to truth, neglecting, even 
vilifying all others. The power of the paradigm is primarily 
epistemological, supported by accompanying sociologies of knowledge and of 
education. For him, the paradigm attenuates the knowledge-possibilities of 
scientific endeavour. Foucault, by contrast, conceives general theories, 
like Marx's, to have power-effects which extend far beyond the 
constrictions of the scientific field in which they are generated and over 
which they exercise a restrictive hegemony. So, for Foucault, the general 
categories of Marx, and the openly 'scientific' manner.of their production 
and presentation, are an obstruction. And not just Marx, though his work 
is obviously the most pertinent to this paper. In fact, he rejects all 
practice which makes claims to a true, scientific knowledge, especially 
. \ where this knowledge is 'motivated' about the object which it claims to 
I? 
know. For example, Marx claims both to !know' capitalism theoretically 
and to link this knowledge to the political transformation of its object, 
I 
real capitalism, which the knowledge 'objectively' reflects: "Philosophers 
have hitherto tried to understand the world; the point, however, is to 
change it". 
Conceptually, then, Foucault constitutes a quite different object of 
analysis. This is neither. the attempt to recuperate in thought an 
'objective' world, nor to discriminate between the competing 'truths' of 
any such recuperations. Foucault's focus rather is upon the knowledges 
themselves and their truth-effects, on the way in which power inflects the 
production of knowledge itself and in which knowledge contributes to the 
exercise of power. To clarify, a lengthy quotation: 
"I would say, then, that what has emerged in the last ten or fifteen 
years is a sense of the increasing vulnerability to criticism of things, 
institutions, practices, discourses. A certain fragirity has been 
discovered in the very bedrock of existence - even, and perhaps above all, 
in those .aspects of it that are most familiar, most solid and most 
intimately related to our bodies and-our everyday behaviour. But together 
with this sense of instability ... one ... also discovers something that ... was 
not initially foreseen, something one might describe as the inhibiting 
effect of global, t o t a l i t a r i a n  t h e o r i e s .  [ A n  unfortunate translation this 
--. 
'totalitarian'] It is not that these global theories .have not provided nor 
continue to provide in a fairly consistent fashion useful tools for local 
research: Marxism and pychoanalysis are proofs of this. But I believe 
these tools have only been provided on condition that the theoretical unity 
of these discourses was in some sense put in abeyance, or at least 
curtailed, divided, overthrown, caricatured, theatricalised, or what you 
will. In each case, the attempt to think in terms of a totality has in 
fact proved a hindrance to research." 
Further, he desribes the predominant feature of his work as 
"...the l oca l  character of criticism. That should not, I believe, be taken 
to mean that its qualities are those of an obtuse, naive or primitive 
empiricism; nor is it a soggy eclecticism, an opportunism that laps up 
any and every theoretical approach; nor does it mean a self-imposed 
asceticism which taken by itself would reduce to the worst kind .of 
theoretical impoverishment. I believe that what this essentially local 
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character of criticism indicates in reality is an autonomous, . , 
non-centralised kind of theoretical production, one ... whose validity is not f l  
dependent on the approval of the established regimes of 
The territories of Foucault's own work of local criticism are by 
now familiar: the asylum, the clinic, the prison, the body and sexuality. 
They cannot be dealt with in detail here. In any case, three or four of 
the principal texts are by now very well known, and works of exegesis and 
criticism appear with every morning newspaper. It is perhaps worth noting, 
however, that the list is not exhaustive; a completed ouevre inviting us to 
abandon our own territories in favour of studies of the madhouse, the 
hospital or the prison etc. The point is not that Foucault retrieves from 
historiographical obscurity some neglected empirical terrains, or fills 
gaps in the historical account of the development of modern societies. The 
point is that his theoretical trajectory finds actual relations of power in 
these social and institutional spaces. He does not deny, indeed he 
forcibly asserts, that relations of power invest all discourses and 
discursive practices: "relations of power are not in a position of 
exteriority with respect to other types of relationship(economic processes, 
knowledge relationship, sexual relations), but are immanent in the 
latter ... Power relations are both intentional and nonsubjective. If in 
fact they are intelligible, this is not because they are the effect of 
another instance that 'explains' them, but rather because they are imbued, 
- through and through, with calculation: there is no power that is exercised 
without a series of aims and objectives. But this does not mean that it 
results from the choice or decision of an individual subject; let us not 
look for the headquarters that presides over its rationality; neither the 
caste which governs, nor the groups which control the state apparatus, nor 
those who make the most important economic decisions direct the entire 
network of power that functions in a society ( and makes it 
function) . . ."(  HofS 94-95) 
Power is everywhere. It is not a thing, to be won or lost, 
enjoyed, wilfully exercised, or seized. Exercised from innumerable 
points, it is immanent in the interplay of mobile relations. The binary 
oppositions of rulers and ruled neither lie at its root, nor serve as a key 
of its explanation. It has no headquarters. There is no central committee 
of public safety. At the same time "...there is no single locus of great 
Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary."(HofS 955-96) Though he is an analyst of power, Foucault 
cannot at the same time be a revolutionary strategist. Like us, he is 
located inside the networks and discourses of power, not just repressed by 
them but also created as a subject by them: There is no 'outside', no 
place where objective knowledges are gathered by minds independent of all 
'authorizations' of truth, free of all discourses and the power of their 
truth-effects. There can be no 'science' of revolution or change based 
upon contemplation of the 'objective' world and its laws of motion, 
precisely because such a science would necessarily share, in its very 
methods, the terrain of power and knowledge of the system its seeks to 
oppose. Somewhere, I can't remember where, Foucault imagines a revolution, 
plainly a socialist revolution, which entirely fails to modify the 
pre-existing relations of power, leaving in place all their actual 
processes while claiming to supplant their previous holders. Stalinism? 
Power, resistance, and their understanding, therefore, may 
not be found in 'objective', scientific macro-accounts of society, politics 
- or history. Such totalizations are abstract and limiting, their grand 
concepts necessarily restrictive if not downright illusory. Local 
research, by contrast, approaches politics from behind and cuts across 
societies on the diagonal. It makes no claim to a reflective understanding 
of an objective world existing outside knowledge; it belongs to no 
.restrictive regime of truth. It sets aside the question as to whether such 
knowledges reflect a true reality. It focusses rather on the knowledges 
themselves, their truth-effects and authorities, their place and function 
in the generation of concrete, ever-changing networks of power. In this 
way, it permits consideration of actual mechanisms of power, the discursive 
contents of the relations of power, without any ascription of motives, 
ideologies, false consciousnesses or other devices which tend to be used to 
explain less why people behave as they do, and more to account for why they 
do not behave as they should according to some higher intellectual or 
theoretical 'truth'. Why won't the proletariat in the West behave like a 
proper proletariat, take hold of its manifest destiny and get organised? 
Why do I accept as true some knowledges, while discarding others? From 
where does the 'authority' of the acceptable come? Does it simply make a 
junction with subjective identities, with 'recognitions' through a process 
that Althusser referred to as 'interpellation'? How is 'authority' 
produced? Where does the 'authority' of science reside, of intellectual 
procedures designed to provide objective knowledges? Are these , , 
categorically different from the 'authorities' and truth-effects inscribed 4 
in non-intellectual discourses? For example, the propensity to consume is 
not the same thing as the 'objective' laws of the market. Yet the power of 
its discourses to enact truth- effects in our own practices is at least as 
great. Truth is not at issue. Authority is. 
So, Foucault's work is not about objects, but about discourses 
which authorise our own and other subjectivities. While admitting, as well 
as analysing the repressive dimensions of the exercise of power, Foucault 
stresses also its creativity. What it creates is us, and him. The reason 
that Foucault is visible on the page as a subject, unlike most 
philosophers, is that he is hurting. He is not concealed as an identity. 
The effects of confinement and restriction cause pain, the creation of 
subjectivity through discourses and their practices causes disatisfaction. 
And therefore resistances. This is why his work can be interpreted as an 
act of resistance. As we shall see in a moment, he refuses special status 
to philosophy or the human sciences or even intellectual work, including of 
course his own. It is a sphere of discursive practice, in many ways like 
the prison or the hospital or the factory, a sphere of the exercise of 
power and a sphere of resistance to it: "Resistances ... are the odd term in 
relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible 
opposite." (HofS 96) Accordingly, resistance in this sphere is no more 
important, no more elevated, than in any other. What is different about 
intellectual work is that it produces precisely the dubious knowledges 
around which discursive practices can revolve: medical knowledges, 
theories of the psyche and of personality, of fertility, sexuality and 
kinship, of discipline, supervision and punishment. The hysterization of 
women, the refusal of the sexuality of children, the disciplinary 
architecture of the school or the prison, the definition of the line 
allegedly lying between madness and sanity, the disciplinary, pastoral 
practices of the Christian church, the professionalization of medicine, 
psychiatry, penology, and the creation of endless languages of sexuality - 
all these, Foucault notes, are both discourses and discursive practices. 
They all inscribe truth-effects and carry relations of power beyond the 
immediate territories of their 'interest' - that is, beyond the asylum, the 
prison or the clinic, and into the subjectivities and the 
self-identifications of the population. They all contribute to a power 
network which is inside the whole run of relationships in society, its 
'authoritative' knowledges and the practices of its local, sectoral 
institutions. 
In a brilliant passage in Discipline and Punish Foucault addresses 
the repressive aspects of these relationships. 'The sou1,'he tells us, 'is 
the prison of the body.' This is perhaps the most famous of all quotations 
from Foucault. At first sight, it is merely an overly-clever reversal of 
Christian dictum, the closure of an argument by paradox. dinner-table 
dynamite. As such, it appears to some to endorse a view of Foucault as too 
clever by three-quarters, locked into the punning language games of a 
certain form of French philosophica1,life. Yet Foucault is quite serious, 
if a little metaphorical: 
"It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an 
ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is 
-.produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a 
::power that is exercised on those punished - and, in a more general way, on 
.:.those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home 
and a t  school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and . 
.supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical reality of 
-the soul, which, unlike the soul represented by Christian theology, is not - 
born in sin and subject to punishment, but is born rather out of the 
-:methods of punishment, supervision and constraint. The real, non-corporeal 
soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the 
effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of 
knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a 
possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the 
effects of this power. On this reality-reference, various concepts have 
been constructed and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, 
personality, consciousness, etc.; on it have been built scientific 
techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of humanism. But let there 
be no misunderstanding: it is not that a real man, the object of 
knowledge, philosophical reflection or technical intervention, has been 
substituted for the soul, the illusion of the theologians. The man 
described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the 
effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A 'soul' inhabits 
him and brings him into existence, which is itself a factor that power 
exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument of a 
political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body."(DandP 29-30) . # >  
q, 
For example, the modern prison, and the discourses of penal 
practice whose technology it is, seek to create 'souls' via the 
disciplining of the body. Through discipline, arduous regimen, routine 
labour and isolation, the reformer's prison, the prison of a humanist 
rationality seeks liberation of the criminal from his criminal 
consciousness. It is intended to create him anew, to reconstruct his 
'soul' by the exercise of power on his body. It is no practice of 
liberation of the 'natural' good man; it is the practice of the creation 
of a good citizen, a good worker, a good father as defined in the 
power-knowledge coda of modern societies. Of course, the refined 
technologies and exquisite interventions of the discourse are always and 
everywhere presented as offering liberation, and the satisfaction of the 
real but unconscious desires of the prisoner. This is why Foucault finds 
in the development of the modern prison exactly the intersections of power 
and -knowledge, precisely the junctions of the repression and creation of 
subjectivities, the very circuits of his notation of power. This is why 
he finds its development so pertinent because it represents over time, the 
enactment in social practice of theoretical discourses of much wider 
significance - notably what . he calls humanism. Consider, for 
clarification, the difference between pre-modern forms of punishment, and 
those of our own.times.. Before '.enlightened' reforms, punishment, he tells 
us, was visited upon the body of the criminal in the form of torture or 
mutilation or death. The crime after all was considered juridically as an 
assault upon the person of the sovereign, the single source of authority; 
and, accordingly, there was a sort of brutal symmetry in the punishment of 
the body so extensively applied, and so publicly observed. In these 
conditions, the prison was principally a holding tank for those awaiting 
judgement and punishment. Only in relatively recent times was the prison 
awarded its reformed, creative functions: that is, not merely to punish by 
incarceration but, through order and discipline, to create in the prisoners 
the self-identities of non-criminals. New practices of punishment, new 
discourses of criminality, new purposes of incarceration 'authorise' new 
perceptions of society, of citizenship, of criminal or other aberration 
and, in turn, are 'authorised' by them. The prison and its reform may 
therefore be considered one of the multiple micro-spheres of the exercise 
of power and knowledge by which the order of the world is changed. 
In the History of Sexuality, among much else, these insights 
are further refined. In particular, Foucault develops here his study of 
the creative aspects of power on the terrain discourses of sexuality. 
There is no space here to review this complex text; but there is one point 
which needs to be made about it. This is concerned in particular with the 
notion of sexual liberation inscribed in many modern discourses of 
sexuality, discourses which loudly repudiate the concealments of sexuality 
and the hypocrisies of the Victorians, even the 'other' Victorians. Claims 
for such .liberation are invariably made in the interests of a freer, more 
natural, more spontaneous sexuality. What Foucault finds striking in this 
respect is not so much the assertion of some sort of 'natural' sexuality 
which plainly underpins some of the liberationaist discourses about it. 
Nor does he reject the facts of the historical repressions of sexuality 
since the seventeenth century: *...As if in order to gain mastery over it, 
it had first been necessary to subjugate it at the level of language, 
control its free circulation in speech, expunge it from the things that 
were said, and extinguish the words that rendered it too visibly 
presentn(17). Discourses 'emblematic' of bourgeois societies imposed 
silences, censorship, prudishness. They acted repressively in a policing 
-6f statements, an expurgation of vocabulary, the . creation of a whole 
restrictive economy of sex. Yet, yet, there has been a steady 
proliferation of discourses concerned with sex, a 'discursive ferment', 
'...and these discourses on sex did not multiply apart from or against 
power, but in the very spac.e and as the- means of its exercise' (32) Even 
the liberationist ones. Further, by these repressions, 'Sex was driven out 
-of hiding and constrained to lead a discursive existence. From the 
singular imperialism that compels everyone to transform their sexuality 
into a perpetual discourse, to the manifold mechanisms which, in the areas 
of economy, pedagogy, medicine, and justice, incite, extract, distribute, 
and institutionalize the sexual discourse, an immense verbosity is what our 
civilisation has required and organised'. Accordingly, despite all the 
babble about sex, what should be blindingly obvious to us remains 
concealed, obscure: that what was involved in the repression of former 
sexualities, in the imposition of a silence about them was precisely an 
'incitement to discourse', regulated as well as polymorphous. Previous 
repression and present discourse are intimately connected; the repressive 
hegemonizing of sexual behaviour gives way to much more subtle discursive, 
creative forms of the exercise of power, multiple forms enacted in medical 
practice, in psychiatry, in jurisprudence, and in criminal justice,etc. 
There is therefore no well of silence about sex. On the contrary, there is 
a multiplication of discourses concerning it which turn both around the 
instances of the individual subject and his or her sexuality, and around 
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the population as a whole and its appropriate reproduction. In this way, C, 
both these are rendered objects of management by power - 'bio-power' in * 
Foucault's less than graceful vocabulary. Thus, the very multiplication of 
discourse is linked to an intensification of the interventions of 
power.(30) It is not possible simply to declare our resistance in words 
and behaviour, to liberate ourselves from the effects of this discursive 
power by assertion. First, we must render our own self-identities visible 
to ourselves, in the context of the practices of power and its discourses 
which have created them. We ourselves, and not the objective world, become 
the proper spheres of analysis. The knowledges whose 'authority' we accept 
become the objects of scrutiny, not the more distant objects which the 
knowledges claim through science truthfully to reveal. Such a scrutiny 
cannot begin with grand scientific categories; cannot read off from 
objective knowledges of class or capitalism the contents of power relations 
or the mechanisms of their exercise. That project requires a quite 
different, and much narrower focus. For two reasons: firstly, because we 
cannot generate scientific concepts without participation in the 
truth-effects of the scientific method; secondly, because, pace Marx, we 
cannot know ourselves as members of the grand categories of science, 
.notably in this case, classes. We know ourselves only as the element, in 
which the truth-effects of multiple discourses are discharged, in the local 
worlds of .our daily lives and work, in the institutions which constitute 
the machineries of discursive powers. And it is only here, from the 
subjective insides, that we can, and sometimes do, resist. Like the 
exercise of power itself, resistance is multiple, local; the two are 
intimately, inextricably connected. Oppositions may apparently be convened 
around conceptions of a future world of transcendent harmony in the form af 
a utopia, or around some dramatic moment of rupture which will transfer 
hegemonic power from one collectivity to another. But these are mere 
organizing illusions, reflecting not only a misunderstanding of the nature 
of power and its effects, but possibly also generating new discourses of 
power requiring further resistance. For Foucault, the conditions of 
possibility of resistance remain inside the relations power, for there is 
no escape from them whether it be in the single bound of the utopian or in 
the organization of a motivated science into political action. 
It should by now come as no surprise that Foucault, discovering 
multiple, labile, mobile, and essentially local forms of power relations, 
insists also an a similar form of possible resistances. Resistance is 
irregular. "...focuses of resistance are spread over time and space at 
varying densities, at times mobilizing groups or individuals in a 
definitive way, inflaming certain points of the body,, certain moments in 
life, certain types of behaviour. Are there no great radical ruptures, 
massive binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But more often one is 
dealing with mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing 
cleavages in a society that shift about.. . .Just as the network of power 
relations ends by forming a dense web that passes through apparatuses and 
institutions, without being exactly localized in them, so too the swarm of 




To conclude, two final points; one of exegesis, the other of 
speculation. The first is concerned with the role of intellectuals, 
especially intellectuals of the left, in Foucault's account of the 
relations of power. The other, briefer, is concerned with the moment of 
1968 and its resonance in Foucault's work, as well as in his notions of 
resistance. This is perhaps best stated first since it amounts to no more 
than a simple speculation. It has two sides, expressible as questions. 
How significant is the shift in the emphasis of Foucault's work at or 
around 1968 or 19701 Before that time, he had concentrated in the main on 
discourses themselves, on their ordering and on the 'archaeology' of 
knowledges: in brief the epistemological side of his work. This did not 
cease after 1970, but the next fourteen years saw an increasing emphasis on 
discursive practices, on history, on power and the forms of resistance to 
it. I wonder how far his later work may be seen as a sophisticated 
theorization of the events and experiences of 19687 
Something of this is visible in his treatment of the role of 
intellectuals I think. Former notions of the function of the left 
intellectual do not survive Foucault's analyses of knowledge and power. 
The grand confrontation of power by truths laconically adumbrated by the 
intellectual as writer, neutrally, de haut en bas, .giving the lie to the 
political and other servants of the great technologies of class power, will 
no longer pass. On the contrary, Foucault treats with a certain contempt + a 
this kind of intellectual activity, suggesting more than once that its time * 
'Z 
is past, that the moment of the grand intellectual as truth-sayer and 
liberator is over, that this self-proclaimed function of the 'writer' or 
the 'scientist' - seldom, he suggests of too much value anyway - lies 
voided of plausibility. "Some years have passed since the [left] 
intellectual was called upon to play this role ...( as the) ... clear, 
individual figure of a universality whose obscure, collective form is 
embodied in the proletariat." "...the threshold of writing as the 
sacralizing mark of the intellectual, has disappeared."( ) It is no 
longer the business of the intellectual "...to place himself 'somewhat 
ahead and to to the side' in order to express the stifled truth of the 
collectivity; rather it is to struggle against the forms of power that 
transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge', 
'truth', 'consciousness' and 'discourse'. In this sense theory does not 
express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice."(quoted 
Smartt 17) 
Conceptions of the intellectual as a vanguard of the as yet 
inchoate revolutionary force of the proletariat are completely collapsed. 
Unlamented by me at any rate, Leninist notions of the role of intellectuals 
are' implicitly thrown out. At the same time, Gramsci's representation of 
the 'organic' intellectuals of the revolutionary class comes under a severe 
assault, his notion of praxis is rendered insecure at the very least, as 
are all marxian. attempts to tie intellectual and revolutionary practice 
together. For Foucault, the principal struggle of the intellectual lies in 
his own sphere and against the forms of power that transform him/her into 
its instrument, precisely in the manner of resistances in other spheres of 
life, and discourse. The struggle of intellectuals understood in this way 
brings them closer, not more distant, from the struggles of others. Yet 
this is not to say that their work should be e u s i v e l y  the site of the 
resistance of intellectuals. After all, in common with the rest of the 
population, they are subject also to the whole net of relations of power, 
and these, too, require to be resisted. Nevertheless, as intellectuals, 
the principal sphere of their resistances should lie in the place where 
they are themselves created by power as intellectual subjects. This, I 
think, is the main burden of Foucault's argument in this respect. 
However, it may be objected, this argument has the effect of 
severing intellectuals in respect of their intellectual work from the rest, 
of isolating their intellectucal activity in a separate sphere. To some 
extent, this is true. Yet it may be argued that this relative isolation ii 
the local sphere of its own practices awards intellectual work precisely 
its due: that is, it renders the work of the intellectual, the conditions of 
its practice, and the problems of power which it confronts neither superior 
to, nor categorically different from the work, conditions and problems which 
face others - in the factory or the prison or the home or the school or the 
asylum, etc. The forms of resistance open to intellectuals is not of a 
higher kind than that which is expressed and mobilised by non-intellectuals. 
It is merely the form appropriate to their local conditions of life and work 
and to the primary forms of discourse and discursive practice hbich inhabit 
them. In this sense, intellectul work both 'authorises' certain forms of 
discourse - but by no means all, or even necessarily the most important of 
them at any given time - as well as providing a site, among many ot5ers, 
where resistances might form, perhaps within the Academy and the power of 
its institutionalized structures. IntellecPual wor!~ is therefore not a form 
of escape from the identity-creating networks of power: it is one of L5e 
spaces that Fower traverses in this process of creation, one among many. So, 
where intellectuals resist as intellectuals,-they form a knot of opposition, 
off which pwer itself might feed, as shown in the case of sexuality and its 
discourses. That is to say, they enact possibly contradictory oppsiticns 
akin to those enacted it other spheres - for example, Li the spheres of 
-sexuality itself, among prisoners or former prisoners, amcng those defined 
as mad, among factory barkers, mothers, fathers, technicians, children, wonen, 
men - in all the manifold spheres where power, kncwledge a d  discxrse 
construct people as subjects, as self-identities. 
"Roger: How many slaves are working on it? 
Carmen: The entire ppulatior?, Sir. Half on nightshift,, half 
on dayshift. In accordance with your wishes, the whole mountain is goinq to 
be excavated. The interior will be as complex as an ant's nest, or the 
Basilica at Lourdes, we don't know yet. Nobody will be able to see anythiq 
f r ~ m  outside. All they'll know is that it's a sacred mountain but inside 
tombs are already being entombed in tombs, cenotaphs in cenotaphs, coffins 
in csffins , urns. . . " 
(Jean Gsnet. The Balcony.) 
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